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Delusions are bizarre and distressing beliefs that characterize certain mental illnesses. They 
arise without clear reasons and are remarkably persistent. Recent models of delusions, drawing 
on a neuroscientiﬁ  c understanding of learning, focus on how delusions might emerge from 
abnormal experience. We believe that these models can be extended to help us understand 
why delusions persist. We consider prediction error, the mismatch between expectancy and 
experience, to be central. Surprising events demand a change in our expectancies. This involves 
making what we have learned labile, updating and binding the memory anew: a process of 
memory reconsolidation. We argue that, under the inﬂ  uence of excessive prediction error, 
delusional beliefs are repeatedly reconsolidated, strengthening them so that they persist, 
apparently impervious to contradiction.
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it is apparent that prediction error, a fundamental parameter in 
associative learning models, is a driving force in salience attribution, 
an observation that is reﬂ  ected in a growing literature within com-
putational modeling (Smith et al., 2006) and empirical investiga-
tion (Menon et al., 2007). Prediction error represents the mismatch 
between what we expect in a given situation and what we actually 
experience. By working to reduce this mismatch, we improve our 
understanding of the causal structure of the world (Dickinson, 
2001). That is, a prediction error is a signal that our understanding 
of, or belief about, the world must be updated. Furthermore, those 
stimuli that engender prediction errors become more salient and 
this will be reﬂ  ected in greater allocation of attention when they 
next occur (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000).
Prediction error theories of delusion formation suggest that 
under the inﬂ  uence of inappropriate prediction error signal, pos-
sibly as a consequence of dopamine dysregulation, events that are 
insigniﬁ  cant and merely coincident seem to demand attention, feel 
important and relate to each other in meaningful ways. Delusions 
ultimately arise as a means of explaining these odd experiences 
(Kapur, 2003; Maher, 1974). The insight relief gained by arriving at 
an explanatory scheme leads to strong consolidation of the scheme 
in memory (Figure 1).
In support of this view, aberrant prediction error signals during 
learning in patients with ﬁ  rst-episode psychosis have been con-
ﬁ  rmed experimentally (Corlett et al., 2007b, Murray et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, the magnitude of aberrant prediction error signal 
correlated with delusion severity across a group of patients with 
ﬁ  rst-episode psychosis (Corlett et al., 2007b). However, there are 
important characteristics of delusions that still demand explana-
tion: notably their persistence. Normal associations can extinguish 
if they prove erroneous, normal beliefs can be challenged and modi-
ﬁ  ed. But delusions are noteworthy for the fact that they remain even 
in the absence of support and in the face of strong contradictory 
evidence. We believe that this striking clinical phenomenon can be 
INTRODUCTION
In a recent and highly inﬂ  uential paper (Kapur, 2003), Kapur 
related the aberrant experiences characteristic of early psychosis 
to inappropriate dopamine signaling by appealing to the concept 
of motivational salience (Berridge and Robinson, 1998), a qual-
ity bestowed on objects or events by virtue of their behavioral 
relevance. Salient stimuli grab attention, drive action and inﬂ  u-
ence goal-directed behavior; processes that are usurped by drug 
related stimuli in addiction (Berridge and Robinson, 1998). Due 
to dopamine dysregulation, psychotic individuals attribute salience 
inappropriately to stimuli, thoughts and percepts. The world of an 
individual with emerging psychosis is strange and sinister, pregnant 
with new meaning. These experiences can crystallize into bizarre 
causal attributions and beliefs: delusions. Under the inﬂ  uence of 
antipsychotic medication, aberrant salience is dampened, patients 
are less perturbed by their experiences and symptom resolution 
begins (Kapur, 2003). That is, the treatment alters the experiences 
such that the delusion can extinguish.
Kapur’s ideas relate to a number of previous suggestions that 
key symptoms of schizophrenia emerge from abnormal attention 
and learning processes (Corlett et al., 2007a). This re-consideration 
of symptoms in the context of a contemporary model for the role 
of dopamine has had a big impact on cognitive neuroscientists 
studying psychosis and supportive evidence has already emerged 
(Corlett et al., 2007b, Murray et al., 2008). We believe that it can 
be taken further and embedded more deeply in the principles of 
formal animal learning theory. In doing so, we provide an account 
for features of delusions that are not readily explicable in terms 
of motivational salience alone: their persistence, which is often as 
striking as their bizarreness.
The salience of an event can be parsed into several components 
(Horvitz, 2002), some of which are represented by dissociable neu-
ral substrates (El-Amamy and Holland, 2007). Salience can relate to 
attention and motivation (Redgrave and Gurney, 2006). Moreover, 
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FIGURE 1 | Prediction error responses during learning, extinction and 
reconsolidation. In these schematics, an upward deﬂ  ection from the baseline 
reﬂ  ects a positive prediction error and a downward deﬂ  ection represents a 
negative prediction error (PE). (A) After normal learning – Dopamine neurons 
come to respond to the conditioned stimulus, the best predictor of the salient 
outcome (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000). When the CS is presented, the 
organism is reminded of the salient event (represented in red). (B) During 
extinction – When the salient event does not occur, a negative prediction error 
promotes new extinction learning: the formation of a competing CS–NoUs 
association (represented in blue) (Bouton, 2000; Eisenhardt and Menzel, 
2007). (C) A small number of brief presentations promote reconsolidation over 
extinction – According to the IRH, brief presentations of the conditioned 
stimulus serve as a reminder and promote reconsolidation of the CS–US 
association, which overrides any new extinction learning that occurs 
when the salient event does not occur (Eisenhardt and Menzel, 2007). 
(D) Competition between reconsolidation and extinction – This schematic 
shows the competition between representations of the CS–US association 
(strengthened by reconsolidation) and the CS–NoUS association (formed 
during extinction). With brief reminder presentations, reconsolidation 
dominates over extinction.
explained within the same framework by considering key ﬁ  ndings 
from the animal learning literature, a literature that has been for-
merly invoked to explain chronic relapse to drug abuse; extinction 
(Crombag et al., 2008) and reconsolidation (Lee et al., 2005).
THE PERSISTENCE AND ELASTICITY OF DELUSIONS
If delusion formation may be explained in terms of associative 
learning then perhaps extinction may represent the process through 
which delusions are resolved (Miller, 1989). Extinction involves Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  July 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 12  |  3
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a decline in responding to a stimulus that has previously been a 
consistent predictor of a salient outcome (Lovibond, 2004).
Prediction error is also central to extinction (Pedreira et al., 
2004). A recent account (Redish et al., 2007) suggests that negative 
prediction error (a reduction in baseline ﬁ  ring rate of predic-
tion error coding neurons) leads the organism to categorize the 
extinction situation as different from the original, reinforced, 
situation and it now learns not expect the salient event in that 
situation. This learning focuses on contextual cues, allowing the 
animal to distinguish the newly non-reinforced context from the 
old, reinforced one. Extinction does not involve unlearning of 
the original association, but rather the formation a new associa-
tion between the absence of reinforcement and the extinction 
situation (Pavlov, 1927). Extinction experiences (the absence of 
expected reinforcement) invoke an inhibitory learning process 
which eventually overrides the original cue response in midbrain 
dopamine neurons (Pan et al., 2008). Individuals with psychosis 
do not learn well from these absent but expected events (Waltz 
et al., 2007), nor do they consolidate the learning that does occur 
(Holt et al., 2009).
But there is more to delusion maintenance than persistence in 
the absence of supportive evidence: delusions persist even when 
there is evidence that directly contradicts them. When confronted 
with counterfactual evidence, deluded individuals do not simply 
disregard the information. Rather, they may make further errone-
ous extrapolations and even incorporate the contradictory infor-
mation into their belief (Joseph, 1986). So, while delusions are 
ﬁ  xed, they are also elastic and may incorporate new information 
without shifting their fundamental perspective. We now go on to 
consider these characteristics with respect to the internal reinforce-
ment hypothesis (IRH) of extinction learning and memory recon-
solidation (Eisenhardt and Menzel, 2007).
MEMORY AND BELIEF
The traditional view of memory as a store that consolidates over time 
has been challenged by demonstrations that recall or reactivation 
of a memory brieﬂ  y restores it into a labile state, rendering it sus-
ceptible to interference by amnestic agents. The process – through 
which memories are recalled, become labile, are combined with new 
information and ﬁ  nally consolidated once more – has been termed 
reconsolidation (Misanin et al., 1968; Nader et al., 2000).
This phenomenon suggests a more dynamic aspect to memory 
function, one perhaps geared toward dealing with incumbent 
information rather than merely retrospection. Furthermore, recon-
solidation has been argued to result in the enhancement of salient 
memories (Tronson and Taylor, 2007), a claim supported by empiri-
cal data. (Lee, 2008; Tronson et al., 2006). Since beliefs must overlap 
with memories (Eichenbaum and Bodkin, 2000), what might we 
learn from the brain bases of memory formation and maintenance 
that will enhance our understanding of delusions?
The IRH contends that extinction and reconsolidation are two 
parallel processes and that an organism’s behavior is based upon 
the balance between the strength of their two memory representa-
tions following memory retrieval. This balance may be modulated 
by prediction error (Eisenhardt and Menzel, 2007). During con-
ditioning, an organism learns a relationship between a previously 
neutral stimulus (CS; e.g., a tone) and a reinforcer (food or  electric 
shock,  US). In a subsequent training session, an unreinforced 
  exposure to the CS (presenting the tone in the absence of the food 
reward) might, besides inducing extinction learning, remind the 
animal about the reinforced situation (when food followed the 
tone). This kind of reminder might itself lead to new learning and 
new consolidation, i.e., reconsolidation (Eisenhardt and Menzel, 
2007). This reconsolidation process appears to be preferentially 
engaged in situations when updating occurs, that is, when addi-
tional information needs to be incorporated into memory (Morris 
et al., 2006; Pedreira et al., 2004).
The midbrain dopamine neuron response to conditioned stimuli 
(Schultz, 1998) might drive reminder learning and reconsolidation 
of the CS–US relationship. In parallel, the surprising absence of a 
US engages extinction, through which a new CS–noUS association 
is formed and consolidated. Which of these representations controls 
behavior depends on the temporal characteristics of the learning 
situation (Pedreira et al., 2004). If the CS is presented exactly as it 
was during training, but no reinforcer is presented, then the organ-
isms’ expectancies are deﬁ  nitively disconﬁ  rmed and extinction 
dominates. However, if the CS is presented, say, more brieﬂ  y than 
previously, the organism’s expectancies are neither deﬁ  nitively con-
ﬁ  rmed nor completely violated. In this case, reconsolidation of the 
CS–US association dominates, driven by the midbrain dopamine 
neuron response which reminds the organism of the reinforced 
situation (Eisenhardt and Menzel, 2007).
INTERNAL REINFORCEMENT HYPOTHESIS AND DELUSIONS
We have conceptualized delusions as a network of associations 
formed by aberrant prediction error signals (Corlett et al., 2007a). 
Given the features of the IRH, perhaps we might interpret the 
persistence of delusions, even in the absence of supportive evi-
dence and the presence of contradictory evidence, by positing 
inappropriate activity in the midbrain reminder system. That is, 
aberrant prediction errors might re-evoke the representation of the 
delusion without deﬁ  nitively disconﬁ  rming it. This would drive 
preferential reconsolidation over and above any new extinction 
learning (Figure 2). The net effect would be a strengthening of 
the delusion through reconsolidation rather than a weakening 
by extinction.
This hypothesis derives support from the phenomenology of 
delusional beliefs; with medication, delusions resolve gradually 
(Stanton and David, 2000), and, during that resolution patients 
describe an intermediate stage, a duality of belief and disbelief 
[“a part of me wants to dispel the delusions whilst a part of me is 
frightened and resists” (Ruocchio, 1991)].
During this phase, patients may describe how much less occu-
pied they are by their delusions. They become less salient (Kapur, 
2004). This transition would be aided by medications which pre-
vent aberrant prediction error ﬁ  ring. The absence of aberrant error 
signals would gradually shift the balance in favor of the extinction 
of delusion-related material (Figure 2). The duality of patients’ 
beliefs is consistent with our suggestion that multiple representa-
tions (in the simplest sense endorsing the belief and not endors-
ing it) compete for expression in behavior. With medication, the 
extinction trace (not endorsing the delusion) comes to win that 
competition. Some more chronically ill patients appear to show 
another kind of double-awareness, known as double- bookkeeping Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  July 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 12  |  4
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(Sass, 2004). Here, patients appear to regain a modicum of insight: 
delusions persist but the patient does not consistently act upon 
them. This may be because chronically ill patients experience severe 
negative symptoms including avolition and emotional blunting, 
with the consequence that delusional beliefs cannot maintain their 
previously high degree of salience. Thus, they no longer feel the 
compulsion to act or ruminate upon the beliefs, though the mem-
ory of how salient the belief used to be is sufﬁ  cient to maintain it 
(Sass, 2004). We argue, after Alberini (2007), that this salience is 
sufﬁ  cient to ensure that the belief is not extinguished.
With medication, the memory trace mediating belief in the 
delusion is not erased. It is overshadowed by extinction learning. 
Hence, if medications are ceased, the delusion returns (Chadwick, 
2001). Moreover, this model could explain why the contents of 
patients’ delusions persist across consecutive psychotic episodes 
(Sinha and Chaturvedi, 1989): since the association persists, albeit 
in attenuated form, recurrence of the neurochemical disturbance 
that provoked it in the ﬁ  rst place will now allow it to re-emerge. 
State dependency may provide further explanatory insight into 
the re-emergence of delusional beliefs when antipsychotic drugs 
are stopped. That is, when the neurochemical sequelae in which a 
memory was formed are reinstated, the probability and richness 
with which that memory is recalled are enhanced (Goodwin et al., 
1969). While most experimental investigations of state-dependency 
have focused on administration of compounds that alter cogni-
tive and mood states, the endogenous altered states of conscious-
ness that attend mental illness have been suggested to engender 
state-dependent recall and therefore alter prognosis (Reus et al., 
1979). Finally, extinguished behaviors and delusions spontaneously 
recover. Even after extinction, the passage of time and the presence 
of interoceptive or exteroceptive contextual cues can cause the old 
behavior or belief to re-occur (Bouton, 2000; see Box 1).
Applying the IRH to delusions suggests that reminding patients 
of their delusions in a therapeutic setting, by trying to disconﬁ  rm 
their beliefs might, paradoxically, lead to an increase in the con-
viction of the belief – if that reminder treatment occurred whilst 
patients were experiencing inappropriate prediction error ﬁ  ring 
(see Figure 2). There is some evidence that this may indeed be the 
case: confronting deluded patients with contradictory evidence 
does indeed strengthen delusional beliefs (Milton et al., 1978). 
Indeed, as we outline above, they may even incorporate chal-
lenging   information into their belief (Simpson and Done, 2002). 
Aberrant prediction error driven reconsolidation might account 
for the voracity with which patients incorporate ostensibly unre-
lated information into their delusional scheme – since aberrant 
prediction error signals remind the patient of their delusion and 
render its representation highly associable, the subsequent recon-
solidation process incorporates the new information, maintain-
ing and strengthening the delusion rather than extinguishing it 
(Figure 2).
Memory reconsolidation may underpin the transition from a 
salient episodic experience to a habitual belief about the world 
(Alberini, 2007). The neurobiological systems responsible for cod-
ing the salience of an event are intimately related to those associated 
with learning and memory, such that modulations of those systems 
with pharmacological intervention can engender inappropriate 
salience attribution (Corlett et al., 2006). Such interventions can 
be substituted for training trials in experimental animals, and can 
strengthen the memory trace to the same extent as it is strengthened 
by actual repeated experience (Alberini, 2007). That is, pharmaco-
logical interventions which enhance the salience of certain asso-
ciations will reinforce or strengthen those associations as if they 
had been repeatedly experienced. The effect of pharmacological 
interventions on the processing of reactivated memories depends 
on how the memory is reactivated (Lee et al., 2006; see Box 1). As 
such, novel therapeutic approaches may well involve bypassing the 
receptor level pharmacology of synaptic plasticity and instead tar-
geting alternative mechanisms of memory maintenance (see Box 2). 
It is possible that reactivation of a memory trace for a salient event 
increases the stabilization of that trace. The most salient memories 
would be reactivated most frequently and would therefore engender 
the most reconsolidation based stabilization, increasing their ﬁ  x-
ity. The net effect would be that a salient experience more rapidly 
and profoundly updates knowledge and perhaps is more likely to 
become enshrined in a belief.
A belief, once formed, can be conceived as an habitual way of look-
ing at the world and of interpreting incoming sensory information 
(see Box 3). It is, in other terms, a schema. Perhaps reconsolidation is 
a crucial component of building such schemata. The transition from 
salient experience to belief habit in psychotic states occurs rapidly due 
to excessive prediction error ﬁ  ring (Corlett et al., 2007a) inducing 
repeated recall of delusion-related material and reconsolidation of 
that material, updated with new information, forming a “schema-
like” representation through which incumbent information is then 
FIGURE 2 | Prediction error ﬁ  ring during delusion formation, maintenance and resolution. (A) Aberrant prediction error promotes delusion formation – 
Aberrant, internally generated prediction error signals imbue mere coincidences (the colors of doors and the sides of the street) with signiﬁ  cance which 
demands explanation (Chadwick, 2001). When an explanation is arrived at, the insight relief may engender dopamine ﬁ  ring which further stamps in the 
association between the odd experiences and the Organization (Miller, 1993). (B) Aberrant prediction error promotes delusion maintenance – Once the 
explanatory scheme has been developed, it is invoked any time an aberrant prediction error occurs. These reminders, serve to reconsolidate the belief that odd 
experiences are a result of the malevolent intervention of The Organization. This reconsolidation overcomes any extinction learning that may occur when no 
harm comes to the sufferer from The Organization or when others try to convince the sufferer that The Organization is not ministrating against them. 
(C) Medications target aberrant prediction error – Antipsychotic medications target aberrant prediction error signals, reminders do not occur and as such 
reconsolidation is blocked. New extinction learning is allowed to prevail and the individual recovers from their delusion. The mechanism for this targeting of 
prediction error induced reconsolidation may be at the level of neurotransmission in the synapse (e.g., Aripiprazole blocking phasic dopamine signaling 
(Hamamura et al., 2007) or it may be intracellular, targeting the way in which the experience-explanation belief is stored epigenetically (Bredy and Barad, 2008). 
(D) Aberrant prediction error promotes delusion maintenance – Prediction errors modulate the representations that govern behavior. Under aberrant prediction 
error, beliefs reconsolidate rather than extinguish. (E) Medication permits extinction learning by blocking aberrant prediction error – Under antipsychotic 
medication, aberrant prediction errors are blocked, allowing extinction learning to dominate and the resolution of the delusional belief.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  July 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 12  |  6
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Classical demonstrations of reconsolidation were based on obser-
vations of amnesia for associations that animals had been reminded 
about just prior to electroconvulsive shock (ECS, Misanin et al., 1968). 
ECS has been administered therapeutically in schizophrenia (electro-
convulsive therapy or ECT). Whilst effective in ﬁ  rst-episode patients, it 
is less so in the more chronically ill (Fink and Sackeim, 1996), perhaps 
because the intervention is applied after a delusion has become stron-
gly consolidated and is less susceptible to disruption.
ECT is usually administered under general anesthesia making its 
targeted application to a pathogenic memory problematic. However, 
ECT has been applied, without anesthesia, with a reminder treatment, 
to patients with ﬁ  xed intrusive beliefs (Rubin, 1976). Patients had 
their attention directed toward their most disturbing beliefs, and were 
instantly given ECT. All patients improved dramatically for periods of 
up to 10 years at the time of publication.
Of course, this approach would no longer be considered ethically 
acceptable. However, the ﬁ  ndings lend some support to the notion 
that the reconsolidation/extinction balance is important for delusion 
maintenance. A less invasive intervention such as transcranial magne-
tic stimulation might be employed to modulate reactivated memories, 
an approach that has also been indicated for motor memory rehabili-
tation following stroke (Bernad and Doyon, 2008).
Alternatively, it may be possible to target speciﬁ  c a reactivated 
memory pharmacologically, reactivating a memory and administe-
ring a drug to impair its reconsolidation whilst its representation is 
still labile. The impact of pharmacological manipulations on memory 
reconsolidation depends on the nature of what is recalled and how the 
memory is re-evoked (Lee et al., 2006): The effects of a glutamatergic 
agonist and an antagonist on reconsolidation were modulated by the 
way in which memories were reactivated. Following a long reactiva-
tion session [favoring extinction], blocking NMDA receptors blocked 
extinction and enhancing their function promoted extinction. However, 
following a brief reactivation session [favoring reconsolidation], the 
opposite was true: NMDA blockade enhanced and an NMDA agonist 
impaired extinction.
D-cycloserine (DCS) an NMDA receptor partial agonist has been 
trialed as an adjunct to traditional dopaminergic   antipsychotics, but 
only modest improvements were observed, and in some patients, 
DCS aggravated positive symptoms (van Berckel et al., 1999). This 
inconsistency may have implications for the therapeutic targeting 
of delusions through reconsolidation blockade. When attempting to 
block   reconsolidation, a brief re-exposure session should be used to 
render the belief labile. If the reminder session is too extensive, the 
amnestic agent will impair new extinction learning that is invoked and 
will lead to maintenance of the maladaptive memory underpinning 
the belief.
An alternative therapeutic approach might involve enhancing 
extinction of the delusional memory. However, this would have a 
limited effect as extinction learning is context dependent (Bouton, 
2000). Following the addiction example, an addict will extinguish drug 
seeking behaviors in a rehabilitation treatment center but they may 
relapse outside this context (Taylor et al., 2009). Training in multiple 
different extinction contexts does not seem to improve this (Bouton 
et al., 2006). The ideal therapeutic approach would involve a combined 
approach which impaired reconsolidation but also encouraged new 
extinction learning.
Despite the observation that directly challenging a delusion may 
lead to a strengthening of the belief (Milton et al., 1978; Simpson and 
Done, 2002) cognitive therapies for delusions have been applied with 
reported success (Chadwick and Lowe, 1990, 1994; Rector and Beck, 
2001; Turkington and Dudley, 2004). It is telling, with respect to the 
current model, that certain principles have emerged, (Chadwick and 
Lowe, 1994) notably:
1. Modiﬁ  cation should begin with the least strongly held beliefs.
2.  Patients are encouraged to consider the alternative to the delusional 
belief rather than to try to accept this alternative immediately.
3.  Evidence for the belief, rather than the belief itself, should be 
challenged.
4.  The patient should be encouraged to voice the arguments against 
his or her beliefs.
In the context of our model, principles 1 and 2 might attenuate 
the excessive reactivation and reconsolidation of the delusion while 
principles 3 and 4 would tip the balance in favor of its extinction.
Given our preference for a combined approach that enhances extin-
ction and impairs reconsolidation, we note with interest the recent 
demonstration of signiﬁ  cant weakening of a fear memory in rats by 
inducing extinction following reactivation (Monﬁ  ls et al., 2009). These 
data could perhaps be mapped onto the suggested parameters for 
CBT targeting delusions. That is, the delusional memory could be 
re-engaged and, whilst it is labile, the data that are considered sup-
portive could be challenged resulting in its extinction.
BOX 1 | Reconsolidation based therapies for delusions
interpreted. To quote Jaspers; “the trail is blazed and the preparedness 
for the signiﬁ  cant experience then permeates almost all perceived con-
tents. The now dominant delusion motivates the apperceptive schema 
for all future percepts.”(Jaspers, 1963) – see Box 1.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that aberrant prediction error signals may 
be important not only for delusion formation (Corlett et al., 
2007a) but also for delusion maintenance since they drive the 
retrieval and reconsolidation based strengthening (Lee, 2008) 
of delusional beliefs, even in situations when extinction learn-
ing ought to dominate (Eisenhardt and Menzel, 2007; Pedreira 
et al., 2004). Given the proposed function of reconsolidation, in 
driving automaticity of behavior (Stickgold and Walker, 2007) 
we argue that in an aberrant prediction error system, delusional 
beliefs rapidly become inﬂ  exible habits. Taking this translational 
approach will enhance our understanding of psychotic symptoms 
and may move us closer to the consilience between the biology 
and phenomenology of delusions that Kapur sought in his article 
(Kapur, 2003).
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Changes in synaptic plasticity are widely believed to underpin lear-
ning and memory. However, the role of synaptic changes in memory 
maintenance was ascertained from preparations assuming Hebbian 
rules; put simply, neurons that ﬁ  re together wire together. Simple 
Hebbian rules deal well with learning about contiguous events but 
they cannot explain the role of prediction error in learning (McLaren 
and Dickinson, 1990), nor can they explain the memory reconso-
lidation phenomena   critical to the current hypothesis (Arshavsky, 
2006). Furthermore, changes in synaptic plasticity may not be the 
mechanism for memory (or belief) maintenance across the life-
span – the components of a synapse that confer its   strength and 
excitability are frequently completely recycled (Arshavsky, 2006). 
A more permanent memory storage mechanism is necessary to 
ensure the accurate restoration of synaptic proteins following such 
recycling events (Arshavsky, 2006). One relatively stable and infor-
mation rich candidate is DNA. Changes in how the genome can be 
expressed could mediate long-term retention of information by an 
organism (Crick, 1984; Holliday, 1999). Such epigenetic changes 
represent a   mechanism through which an organism can adapt to its 
environment and maintain that adaptation throughout its lifetime, 
processes that are likely disturbed in a number of mental illnesses 
(Bredy, 2007).
Much of the genome may be silenced in a particular cell, whilst 
other portions will be highly expressed; a process mediated in part 
through changes in proteins called histones which combine with DNA 
to form chromatin. Histone proteins can be modiﬁ  ed in a variety of 
ways which impact upon how readily the DNA with which they are 
associated can be expressed as protein. Histone modiﬁ  cation makes 
an important contribution to learning related gene expression. One 
particular histone modiﬁ  cation, changes in acetylation, is mediated 
by an enzyme called histone deacetylase (HDAC). Inhibition of HDAC 
enhances long-term memory (Levenson et al., 2004).
Barad and colleagues recently demonstrated that the HDAC inhi-
bitor valproic acid modulate extinction and reconsolidation of condi-
tioned fear. They hypothesize that HDAC inhibitors: “overcome the 
reconsolidation-like incubation of fear by spaced CS-presentation to 
allow effective extinction to take place” (Bredy and Barad, 2008). 
This is exactly the desired effect for an antipsychotic drug within the 
context of the IRH. Whilst valproate, has not been trialed as a stand-
alone antipsychotic, it does beneﬁ  t patients with schizophrenia as an 
adjunct to antipsychotics (Basan and Leucht, 2004), future research 
should explore the role of HDAC inhibition as an antipsychotic mecha-
nism, particularly its potential application in combination with reminder 
treatments as a therapeutic approach to delusions.
BOX 2 | The biology of memory maintenance
We have recently speculated on the interaction between prior beliefs 
and current sensory experiences (Corlett, 2009, Fletcher and Frith, 
2009) and how delusions may arise from an imbalance in these inte-
ractions. We argue that, in the earliest stages of psychosis, prior 
to delusion formation, noise in the nervous system leads to exces-
sive free energy or prediction error (Friston, 2005). Subjectively, this 
experience is of a mutated world, one which feels strange, perhaps 
sinister and beset by new signiﬁ  cance. Priors are updated in order to 
minimize free energy and this must necessarily lead to the formation 
of new beliefs and expectancies. The new model of the world is built 
to accommodate or explain away these strange experiences. With 
continued aberrant prediction error those new priors are strengthened 
further. In the terms of the present model we suggest that memory 
reconsolidation provides a potential mechanism for this updating pro-
cess. With sufﬁ  cient reconsolidation, the priors become so strong as 
to be resistant to contradictory evidence.
Pavlov believed that one could equate his conditioned reﬂ  exes with 
Helmholtz’ learned perceptual expectancies (Barlow, 1990; Helmholtz, 
1871/1971), an assertion supported by empirical evidence (Davies 
et al., 1982). Recently, computational neuroscientists have also come 
to appreciate the overlap between learning and perception, emphasi-
zing the consilience between formal theories of conditioning, Bayesian 
accounts of learning and signal detection theories of perceptual deci-
sion making (Dayan and Daw, 2008). According to such combined 
models, organisms must learn the rules of the game they are playing 
and, in the context of those rules, they must discern meaningful events 
and contingencies from meaningless noise. Organisms achieve this by 
maintaining a robust but ﬂ  exible set of expectancies about the world 
that tune their sensitivity and responses biases.
Estes drew similar parallels between learning, memory and signal 
detection theory in his stimulus sampling theory of memory (Estes, 
1997). Here, after a memory trace is encoded, the occurrence of 
the same or similar events reactivates the trace, necessitating some 
re-encoding or reconsolidation process, arguing that this process is 
subject to random error, due to the physiological noise that permea-
tes the nervous system and provides the analytical basis for signal 
detection theory (Green and Swets, 1966). Estes hypothesizes that 
random error (or physiological noise) at re-encoding may account for 
the loss of detailed information, the incorporation of spurious details 
and the shift toward familiar information that occur with successive 
reproductions of information from memory (Bartlett, 1932). Unlike 
Estes’ model, in our account prediction error signal (both appropriate 
and inappropriate) drives memory reactivation and also impacts on 
how that memory is re-encoded.
We argue that delusions occur in the context of a noisy nervous 
system that is attempting to form and maintain a robust set of priors. 
Such excessive noise would engender more cycles of reactivation 
and subsequent reconsolidation, leading to a bizarre and maladaptive 
set of expectancies about the world, expectancies strong enough 
to vitiate normal sensory and cognitive experience. These learned 
expectancies have much in common with Jaspers’ apperceptive 
schema’ – beliefs so strong that they are impervious to sensation – 
which he believed were the basis for the maintenance of delusional 
beliefs (Jaspers, 1963).
BOX 3 | Perception, learning and belief
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